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Abstract 
i;irimcial markets perform a seemingly simple function: facilitating the transfer 
of securities into cash, or cash into securities. Closer inspection of the activities 
m d  the information intensity of a trading floor or a dealing room reveals g r a t  
compiexity. Information technology (IT) plays a crucial role in supporting maker 
activities, and no trader today could operate without real-time data services, and 
computer-based analyticd tools. hlaket  information - about prices, interest 
rates? tmszctions, investor suppil; and demand, and compzny and economic news 
- is at the heart of any trading operation. Consequently, the major international 
markets from Tokyo to Zurich are making incrased use of information techno- 
iogy. While IT is capable of m&ng physical marketplaces and trading floors 
obsolete, no consensus is emerging on the design of an integrzted global financial 
market, and many technologicd and regulatory issues remzin unsolved. Multiple, 
fragmented markets may be a consequence of the lack of coordination. This 
chapter highlights the technologies that are revolutionizing international financial 
markets. The future direction of financial markets will be chmed by automation 
and systems, and IT'S influence on banks, securities f~rms,  and the markets 
themselves will continue to be a subject of debate and controversy. 
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1. lntroduct  ion 
Financial rri.zrkets aound the world are In the midst of a dramatic trmsformation. 
Regulatorv m d  mzket  Dmers have fallen, 2nd automai-ion contmues to restructure trading 
precesses. lowenng Lhe costs of transacting rnonltonng financial markets. Obseners have 
dectllued "The End of Gtmgrzphy" In financial nizkets': imat~on plays a greatlv d~minished role 
m mvesiors' decisions International market ~nte~rzr ion  1s occurring at a rapd pace, and 
giobdmtlon IS no longer a buzzword; it has mved. It 1s not unusual to hear of a British 
aroier placing a lzp;sqeqe conglomerate's Deutchnzrk-denominated secuntles with a U.S. 
Fnsion find mXzger z part of an undemrii~ng m m g e d  by a subsidmy of a Snlss bank in 
I-uxembourg To heage the r,sk of adverse sh~fts  In currency values or ~nterest rates, the 
InLesror may s i m u l m e o ~ s i y  execute trades In z screen-based market. such as Globex. Such 
zcmlues provide benefits through lncrezsed InLestor diversification, lower costs of company 
funding. a d  increased ccmpetit~on across market p m i c ~ p ~ t s .  
Such ~ ~ s i o r r r ~ a t ~ o n s  do ot occur w~thout uphaval and discomfon for some market 
p m c ~ p a n t s .  The move to global markets has heightened competition, and financial technology 
often leads to i o u - m a g ~ n .  undifferentiated products [CLEhlgl]. The return on capital for 
member firms of the London Stock Exchange between 1987-1990 was negaive 2 percent. 
Emplokrnent in the Y.S. securiues industry has fdien from 262,000 in 1987 to 223.000 in 1992. 
Responding effecr!~el) to the changes and pressures will be the hallmark of successful firms and 
expmding rnarhr: ceniers in the coming >ears it'iiiie information technology threatens some 
sources of pro5:s. 11 $so creates opportunities znd a means of reacting to market challenges. 
For instance. ep!scdzs of Intensified market vo la t~ i~ ty  such as the October 198'7 a d  October 
1989 price brezks h z ~ e  l a d  to the development of increasingly sophisticated risk management 
I See O'Bnen, R .  Global Financial Inregdon: The End of Geography, Roval Institute 
of International Af i a r s ,  P~nter  Publishers, London, 1992. 
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systems. Technoiogy has spawned "firimcid e ~ g i n e r i n g " ,  the pacLaginp of sophisticzted, 
hvbrid finmcid insrdments tzilored to investor n e d s .  
Tms chapter survevs the techno1og1t.s m a  computer innovauons that a.re transforming 
financial mzrkets worldwide. Indicat i~e of rne chmges, the most advanced infomiation 
technology on the S e w  York Stock Exchage  (NJ'SE) floor in 1964 was a stzndard annunciator 
board on the w a l l ,  similar to those used in roadcjde diners to d e n  uauesses  that customer 
orders were read!. Tine board notified members by their badge number of incoming telephone 
orders. In a 5 - l L  hour trading day, fioor traders often walked 15 miles. In contrast, today's 
foreign exchange market is based on s c i e n  pnce displays and traders opeztlng from well- 
equipped deal~ng rooms. Chier a third of 41 fore~gn exchmge total are executed on-line 
via screen "conversations" among between ri-izrket participants s p r a d  across the globe. 
- 
. NYSE Floor (1964) Reuters Dealing 2000 (1992) 
Figure  1 
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Although commercial appl~cat~ons of computers expandea npidly in the 1960s a id  1970s. 
pnmitlve commun~cations system: %ere unable to handle the liitncacies of trad~ng. Marke?: 
requlied face-to-face contact on phisicd trading floors, or extecslve telephone searches of 
brokers aid c i d e r s .  Nineteenth century technologies such as the telepnone and the stock t~cke: 
incresed the outside exposure of trading. b u t  until recently the need for floor markets RS  
unques;loned ' Today's more ~nforrnation systems c m  perform manv of the muket': 
iniormat~oniliy intensive functioric such as ~ a t c h i n g  buyers a d  sellers, finding prices at iilhjct, 
G e e s  should occur, and procexsing Ir^zns;icuons. Many czpi'd markets today funcbon a: 
networks of linked trader terminds, a number of firms opzrate global communlcrit;onc 
network for s h m n g  data on posit~ons xi? ridctlvitjes, and for senlng ciients without r e p r o  to 
I w u o n .  Responding to their c~!stori~ers and competitive pressures from information vendor: 
that have established trading n e t ~ o r k s ,  tradit~onal fioor-b~sed stock exchanges and futures 
markets have undertaken significant automation projects. 
Firms operating in f i n a c i d  rrixkets are smong the most ~ntensive and innovative users 
of infornabon technology. Securities firms in the U.S. spent 3'7.5 bili~on on IT in 1991. or 
about 20 percent of their noninterest expense. Other types of orgaiinizations using IT extensiveiv 
are investment institutions, informaiion vendors, and the market reguiators. Information vendors 
supply data to market participznts, and mzke use of advanced telecommunications networks and 
sitellires to speed ~ansmissions zound the globe. The exchanges themselves spend 2 l a g ?  
percentqe of their operating budgets on technology for informarlon retrieval and mding 
support. A third of the NYSE's 1990 budget of $300 miliion was spent on systems md  
technology. The London's LIFFE market devotes 35 percent of ~ t s  operating budget to 
' Among the earliest proposals for electronic trading were E-lscher Black's "automated 
specialist". described in 1971. and hlendelson's Automated Trading System [BLAC71] 
[MEND72]. Researchers have slnce suggested a number of other eiectronlc means for facllltating 
markets and securitres trading [PEAK179][AHIH85][SCKw89j 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93- 12 
IT in lnternatjonal Financid Mxketc Page 4 
~n io rxauon  technoiogy. The Securities and Exchange Comrn~ssion (SEC). the indusuv regulator 
sn the U.S. ,  is currently phasing in its Electronic Da& Gathering. Analys~s and Retneial system 
EDGAR)  for on-line fil~ng of 6:sclosure documents from corporat~ons m d  investment managers 
EDGAR will cost $75 mili~on. a d  by 1997 will replace current paper filings, which total 10 
rn~lllon pages per year. 
2 .  Financial Basics: I n ~ r u ~ n e n t s ,  Investment. and 3barliet l n fmt ruc tu r f -  
Fixancial markets exis! ;IS a compjex of seLuniles =id Imtrclments, investor decision- 
rr,&ng. and a financial inf;as+mcture to support tracir,: trade processinE. These a e  
detailed below. 
Instruments. Anything of iejile c m  be traded, and mercnmts, xa-ketplaces. and b z i x s  have 
ex~sted since the dawn of ~ ~ \ i l i ~ t i o f i .  Financial markets facii~taie the transfer of money into 
financid instruments, whlch are issued, or sold to investors by companies to r a s e  cap1.d. or 
by goxernment bodies to borrow funds. Most trzded instruments fall into one of several 
smdard  categories. While a large company may mmufaciure mmy products In v a n o u  sizes. 
coiors, and configurat~ons. ~ t s  muntles will be smdxira~zed into a narrow rmge  bv the type of 
claim they represent for the Investor. 
e Common stock or equity is m ownership s h z e  sn a f~rrn 's  profits and net worth. Equity 
holders receive dividends, rind vote on corporate actlone. 
6 Bonds o r f i r d  income ~ b l i g ~ o n s  represent loms or contractual claims to a specified 
stream of repayments. The typical bond pays interest up to the maturiq date, when the 
face value or principal 1s returned. Bonds are ~csued by government bod~es  m d  
companies. Notes and bills are similar to bonds. but have shorter maturities. Bills 
mature in a year or less. m d  notes have m ofiginal matunty of 1 to 10 yeas. 
s hlarkets also exlst forph~sical  commodities like gold. oil. zrd agricultural p roduct .  m a  
for foreign currencies. 
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Markets d ~ f i e r  depending on the timing of the zsset's transfer. Often. a t - a s c t i o n  
wcurs today for a financial instrument that the purchaser may not own until some months or 
v m s  into the future 
In cash or s p o ~  rnarieis. ownership of the tridpd Instrument is transfered immediately. 
Purchasing 100 chzres of lntel stock ai S i l l  today maris that 100 lntel shares will be 
added to the buver'c account and $1 1.800 \s*11l be credited to the seller's funds on the 
setdement date i 5  cays after the m d e  in the U.S.,. 
la Options contracts confer the right to buy or seli an asset or financial instrument at a 
specified nrike  price during the contzct lifetime, which ends on the option's expiration 
date. For instance. the purchaser of a call oprion on lntel with a strike pnce of $120 
expiring in w o  months has the right to buy 1 0  lntel shares at $120 up to the expiration 
date regardless of lntel market price. I f  Intel's sha-e price rises, the vziue of this option 
will increase. The option expires worthless if lniel's price is below S120 at expiration. 
e In forn.ard or  furures markets, a pnce zna a delivec d a e  someilme In the future are 
specified On the dellvery or  expirat~on cale. ownership transfers and the pre-agreed 
price IS p a d  by the buyer and received b) the seller. For instmce, an investor may buy 
a S i  rn!llion futures contract in April at a yeld of 5.0% for December del~verv of 90-day 
Treasun B~l!s. On the delivery day In Apnl, the seller delivers a T-Bill having 90 days 
to matuniv, m d  the buver pays the present vdue of $1 million d~scounted at 5 .0%,  or: 
S l  ,o00,odo - (0 .050*1.~ ,000)*90/360 = 5987.500. 
Futures rnxhets oeveloped to meet the needs of izrners and food merchants to protect 
or hedge thcrnwl\es aganst fluctuations in agriculture prices caused by weather ma crop cycle 
~ n c e r a n b e s  T a d ~ n g  t>pcally occurs in open outcry trading p ~ t s  with pnces shouted out and 
p o o d  "as long as the brezth I S  harm."  Today's Ixgest futures exchange, the Chicago Board of 
'Tnde (CBOT), uas founded in 1848. With futures, farmers could lock-in a pnce for crops at 
the beginning of the growing season, and food producers could be c e m n  of a supply of 
materials at a fixed cost Frnanciol furures uere Introduced for foreign cunencles in 1972 a[ 
the Chicago hlercvltile Exchznge (CME) Tocah. financial futures on bond:. interest rates, 
stock indexes, and ciinenc~es x e  the most heav~i); lraded futures contracts. Future tradrng has 
grown in part due to the lo-er costs of tradins futures compared to the cash make t  intruments. 
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.A study by Prudential ilorifolio Mmagerc in London showed the cost of buying and later selling 
a stock position was 1.9 percent of the posit~on \ ,due. For z similar position: a round trip trade 
in futures cost 0.053 percent.? With futures. Irvestors can gain exposure to a market, or layofi 
some of the risk of theh positions quickiv m a  chapiy .  In order io maint&n the exposure, 
however, the futures contracts need to be rolled o-~,er at their expiration date (every 3-6 month5 
on average), l ad ing  to mother trade md set of tnnsaction cost>. 
Futures and optlons are cdled den '~ iu i i c  srcuriiles because their pnces are bzsed on. or 
are d e n ~ ~ a h v e  of. the czsh maket pnce fo; me u n d c f i i n g  m e :  The den~at ives  markets xir 
among the most rzpidly growing finmcid rarkeis Volumes at the CROT and the CME, the 
world's two lxgest futures markets. trij~led Detwwn 10?2 and 1992. in the s a n e  tlme penod. 
the managed futures industry in the U.S.  has grolA n from several nlllion dollars to S21 biliion 
under management. - JVarrants, suapc. commercial paper, nghts. converible bonds, m c  
several other financial ~nstruments are actively traded, but will not be described here. 
Investment. Investments are made I R  expectation of attractive, posit~ve returns, but an\ 
investment e n d s  risk. Stock pnces fluctuate according to mzke t  conditlons, and the 
company's profits and prospects. Bonds pnces ~a.ry according to interest raies I n  the economy. 
and changes In the credlt~orthiness of the izsuer. Bonds are subject to defaub when worsening 
business conditlons make it impossible f ~ i  m issuer to meet its obi~gations. Hence, bonds with 
a greater likelihood of default pay a higher interest rate. 
.i 
Technology can improve the mzagement of risk. but i t  will not eiim~nate market pnce 
fluctuations. Some observers believe that financial mvkets are excessively volatile, and that 
reducing t r ~ ~ s a c t i o n s  costs through auiomation only exacerbates voiatil~ty by promoting 
3 dters, R .  "U.K Insurance Groups See a Brighter Future in  Den\.atives", Financial 
Times, 21 December 1992, p. 19. 
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superfluous tnding.  The evidence on market inefficiencies ma excess voiatility is inconciusive. 
Andysis of NYSE prices since 1830 showed that between 1980 and 1990 prices were only 
slightlv more volatile than in the 19'70s. but were less volatile thm in the 1920s, 14'30s: and 
1890s." Since systems can increzse pdc ipa t ion  a d  information access, 2 move toward screen- 
b a e d  24-hour mrirkets nay  have the effect of reducing pnce shocks and voiatility. 
lnvertors typically diversib thelr Iniestment portfoi~o Ok holdlng a range of secunt.le: 
The vzlue of diversification uas  q ~ m t ~ f i e d  by the Nobel prze- inning economist H- 
h1akou.lt.z In the 1950s. M a r k o w i ~  demonstrated that a aiveisi5ed portfolio had a hlghe: 
expxted rate of return or a lower \ zmnce (rkk) of return thm an undivers~fied p ~ r t f o i i o . ~  The 
iadmark  Caprial .&set Pricing ~Ifodel (C.APM)~ followed from Portfolio T h e o q ,  and 
established that rauonal investors will expect a return from m y  secunty i that is propomonal to 
~ t s  risk u masured  by its bera, 6,. Ee& is the undrvers[fiable nsk of Investing in asset 1. a n d  
is measured by p, = Cov(i,M)/Var(h?). uhere Cov(i,hl) is the c o ~ a ~ m c e  of returns on secunt? 
i with returns on the entire market. M. and Var(?4) is the Lzmnce of returns on the narkel 
Ekta refiects a stock's volatil~ty. and I S  the amount that investors expect the stock price to change 
for each 1 percent chmge in the market. A beta of 1.5 ~ m p l ~ e s  that a 1 percent change In enure 
market I S  expected to result in a 1.5 percent change in secunty 1's pnce. 
"'Safer than It h o k s " ,  The Economist, 4 August 1990, p. 63. 
Markowitz, H.M., "Portfolio Selection", Journal of Finance. Vol. 7 ,  pp. 77-91. March 
1952. 
S h a i .  W.F., "Capital Asset Pnces: A Theory of Market kquilibnum under Condit~on: 
of S s k " .  journa l  of Finance, Vol. 19, pp. 425-442, September 1964. 
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Figure 2 :  Flow D i a p m  of Securities Invesirne~t Decisions md 
examples (shadedj of Portfolio hlamgement Technology 
\lenders and in-house systems groups have de\~eloptd informat~on technoleg! io suppr .  
f 
Desired Asset . 
Holdings: 
Diversify across 
siocks, bonds, 
sectorz, borders, 
etc. 
.................................................. 
A n d y ~ i ~  a d  selection 
oi  amactive c o n b k z -  
tioos o i  =.set clazcses, 
such t a n a s ,  s t o c k ,  
a d  real  esate .  
Monitor exposme 
ali szges of the securities investmenr process. 
+ Communicaie 
and settlement 
........................... ._............ 
Order execution md 
systems t r m i z i t  d e d  capture s:,.Sie=s. 
i n ~ e ~ t o i  rders to Machine r e d s b i e  
the spp:op::aie 
m z k e t p i a c e  
----- 
hlarket infratructure. The keys to a well-functioning finu~cial market are capiid,  psopii, 
and t~chnolog-y. Capital in a n z k e t  IS the sum of the finxkcial resources that back the b z n k  
ma securities firms that pmicipatr in the market. Grea~er levels of capital raise crelli- 
worthiness, enable participants to bear greater risks, and loher the chances of that r r i ~ k e i  
~ar t ic~pants  fail to meet their f i n a c i d  obl~gations. People in a na rke t  contribute ski]! a i d  
ingenuity in bnnging together those companies and governments s e e h g  to raise iuncs. with 
those lnaividuals and institutions seehng to invest wealth. W?ille finzric;'d resources ;ire c n c i D .  
the sdhpe "ihe assets walk out the coor at the end of the cz)." appl~es to firms operating ir 
finmcld markets. 
In  only a few advanced expert systems applications is technology used to dispiace huir,w, 
tmding iuagment. However, syslems have replaced face-to-face md person-to-person contact 
as the principal conduits of inform-uon in modem financial ~ u k t t r .  i n  the past. nirheis 
existed onlv when people sathered in one physical place. Twenty stock exchmges were 
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o p E u n g  In B n m n  in 1900, but In 1973 A1 trading %as consolidated in London. Muke t s  today 
c;iq r a c h  out to a vast coiiecuon of customers, m a  cocsolicate diverse opinions from anv polnt 
on the global. and at a) time of' day. Technology kzs  so i~creased the back-ofice effic~encv 
of the securiues ~ndus;n In many markets. tedious trzoe settlement papemork has been 
repiaced bv computerized book entry for traasfemng ounership. and electronic funds bmsfer 
for movlng payments. 
?-he principal masure of a market's attrzct~veness I S  its liquidit). The liquidin, of a 
rr,zri.e: or a iinancid instrument is mezsured by the ezse m d  the economy of trznsiorming cash 
into the secunt?. and beck a s a n  at pnces tkar reflect the asset's fair \ d u e  Amihud and 
Mendelson (1991) idenrifled four trasactions costs triat lo%er a s e c u ~ t v ' s  liquldit\. 
(1) Bid-ask spread i c  2 cost resulting from the difference between the best pnce to sell md  
to buy In the market 
( 2 )  hlarker impact costs a e  incurred when a lxge trzde can only be completed with a price 
concession by the Investor 
(3) Delavs and seach  costs are incurred when m investor seeks better trading terms by 
postpnlng 2 trade a d  trving to find ;in interested counterparty 
(4) Direct costs commissions are paid as a percentiipe of the value of a trade. For instance, 
institu:~ond investors pay 6.5 cents a share on at,erzge for trading NYSE stock. 
Low t m u c a o n s  costs improves trading and mwket liquidity. This allows securities 
ownership to shift eisi!y so that capital flows efficiently from investors to expanding businesses. 
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3. Technology in Financial Markets 
3.1. History 
In 17th centur); Bnmin, m ~ l n g  cornp;;,'li~ such as the F ~ s t  India Company issued 
securities to finance shipbuilding m d  dock construction in London, and to pay for long voyages 
that rerimed i a ,  splce, a d  silk for Englad's home markets. U.S. ficancial markets were 
'L 
organzed to enable the tr^ddiri,o of former colonies' revolutionary u x  debts. Scmdds  and frziuds 
were prevalent In the m l y  stock markets. Sha~es  uere issued in 1'720 13 London by the South 
Sea Compmy. whlch proposed to open up trzde arid markets for new commodities in South 
America and the Faclfic. The price rose from f 128 to f 1,050 between h4arch and September. 
but collapsed and the shares were nea-111 ~alueiess  by December when the promised dividends 
failed to appear. 
The London Stock Exchmge has its onglns in New Jonatkan's Coffee House when zn 
entrance fee uas Imposed on traders In 1'738 to beep out "riff-raff". Tne participating broker. 
formally esiabiished London's Stock Excha,ce in 1773. The forerunner of the h'ew York Stock 
Exchange was formed in 1792 by the Bution\*ood sgreement of [went>-lour brokers to establisk 
an orderly market and to share trading ~nformatlofi. A minimum comm~csion of 0.25 % was set 
(and mantan& untrl 1975), and members &,creed to give preferent;ld treatment to one another. 
Flxed commlscions. d o n s  with the res:ncllcns licensing rnmtizled b, the agreement, had 
the effect of cieatlng a profitable c m e l  for the treders that took pm. An octside, "curb" mxket 
remained, md  lzter bwame the American Stock Exchange. 
The iormatlon of organized secunrles markets led to officid market information. 
Newspaper-published stock prices in Keu I'ork first appeared in 18!5. The telegraph was 
~nvented in 1135 bv hlorse m d  Vail. and -+.as eu~cklv used to transmit pnces between New York 
and Philadelph~a and New Orleans, rep1aclr.g horse and train journeys that delayed the news 
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from half a cav to a week. As Gxbade and Sllber (1975) demonstrated. the Transatlantic cabir, 
wbch m 1866 esublished-telegraph commun!cation between Sew York and 'London, affected 
pricing m a  chmged trading pracuces in those ci:~es' currency, stock. md  bonds markets. Time 
lags that had been 20 days Qere reduced to minutes, and the avezige aboiute pnce difference: 
for securiue t ~ d e d  in both make& dropped 69 percent from the~r previous levels. The electro- 
mechanical stock ticker (1867) and the telepnone (18'76) were SSO iapidiy adopted by make: 
p ~ c i p ~ t ~ .  a d  enabled finmcid makers ai the ilme to extend their i a c h  md their i m p o r a c e  
in the economy. Kew York-based brokerage houses that establ~shed a presence In other pam 
of the c o u n p  to serve retzil investors became known as "u~rehouses" for their rellance or, 
telegraph cornmunica~ons. 
Insider trading takes flioh; 
A n  early case of w indfa l l  p rc i i l s  f rom trading w i t h  inside, nonpublic informarion 
occurred w h e n  Na than  Fiothchild received advanced n e w s  via carrier p igeon of 
Wel l ington's defeat  o f  Napolean at Water loo in 181 5. Fiothchild bought  shares at  l o w  
prices f rom un in formed and anxiety-racked traders i n  London, and made his fami ly 's  
for tune f rom hav ing received the favorabie n e w s  first. Since the  t imeiiness o f  a trader's 
n e w s  relat ive t o  fe l l ow  traders makes the dif ference be tween  for tunes and losses, 
technology t h a t  speeds the f low of price-sensitive informat ion has a lways found ready 
appl icat ion i n  f inancia l  markets.  
The ccmmerciaiizztion of computers In the 1950s g r ~ i l y  increased access to financld 
market inforn:auon. Quotron ~ntroduced on-line interrogat~on for siock market information ir 
1960. Brokers anywhere could enter a .?-letter code for a stnch, x i d  receive the last trade pnct.  
daily ~olurne of sbaes  traded. and the current pr;lce quotes. Prevlousiy. only reported pncec 
of prevziling trades were available on the ticker, and conccolidation rind querylng of h~stonc 
prices uzs not possible. Infornauon systems also made possible the streamlining of the after- 
trade settlemenl and clearjng process. Archac, paper-based settiement svstems led to the 19647 
1968 "back-office crisis", and forced V.S. stock makets to close on Wednesdays dunng the ]as; 
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slx months of 1968. The subsequent Improvements to se;tierner,t enabled exchanges to c o p  with 
surging trading volumes of the 19'70s and 1980s. 
3.2. Economic Effwtc of IT 
Mlcroeconomic theones of t inmcid market ilje buiir on the assumption of cosfiess 
t-zcing and freely availabie ~nforrnat~on.  In fact, tr%ns;ictlcns costs are significant. ?=ding in 
fir,a~c;dl rnarkets may involve paying brokerage commiss~ocs md other direct traalng costs. 
subscnblng to information md  research services. and berznr-ig the risk of price changes dunng 
the delay between rndiclnp an Investment decision and the eventual execution of the uade. 
Inlornation technology. hokevex. lessens the impormce o i  bme and distance in secunues 
iradlng. 2nd has been shoun ?o reduce transactions toss md  frictions. In addition. IT ha: 
cpened up markets to additicnzl pw~lcipants md has i n c r a ~ d  cornpetiuon. Reseach into the 
general effects of IT on industries has claimed that elecironic mzrkets allow customers to s m c h  
ma conpare many products at low cost, thus heightening competiuve pressure among suppliers 
[M.4L087]~AK091] .  The oberdili effect of IT is 10 bnng financial markets closer to 
microeconomic ideal. and rrizxlmlze the economic benefits prov~ded by market acuvit~es.  
Mxket  theory has at its foundation the assumption of market cleanng through LC 
equll~bnum pnce formauon model. For secur i~es  markers. t h ~ s  hzs meant a fnctlonless t r ad ln~  
mechm~sm based on a call-type, U7alrasran aucrlori. In a Wzir~sian auction. an e o u ~ l ~ b n u m  
pnce I S  reached through an iterative process known zs riiionnernenr in which buyers and seller 
~ndlcate their net demands for dl1 securities at all combinations of pnces. The Walraslan aucuon 
is m abstraction, and pracucal difficulues in operating such a procedure prevent its appl~cauon 
in actval securities markets Instead. markets use tr2Glng mechanisms to convert ~nvestors' 
orsers to buy and sell lnto prices a d  executed trades. An order is the basic processing eiement 
in trading. It specifies to buy or seli a certain number of securities. contingent perhaps on other 
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events or condit~ons In a r a k e [ .  For insmce ,  2 limd order may specify the purchzse 5,000 
shares of Motorolr., at the l ~ r n i t  price of S60 or less. I f  the snaes  can onlv be purchased at a 
pnce higher thm 6 0 ,  the order goes unexecuted. A marker order instructs the broker to trade 
at the best avklabie pnce In the market. 
1%-hitcomb (1985) identified a rringe of different make1 structures in use in stock market: 
zound the world. Although details can vary, m ~ k e t ~  differ on two principd dimensions. First, 
mz:rtets may faci!itaie conrinuous trading, or buch  or  call rmding. In a continuous market, 
such zs the F e w  l'ork S i ~ k  Exchange, tndes can exemre at any time at the cuoted bid md  
offer prices. The bid pnce in z continuous maker I r  the pnce at which investors can sell 
securi~ies, m d  uill be sor;ieu.kat iess than the offer price at which they can purchase securities. 
The difference Sefu,een the highest bid quote a d  the lowest ask or offer quote for a security is 
cdled the bid-usk sprcad, m d  is a transaction ccct p a d  by investors. In a cali ma-ket, a single 
price is set at the  tume of the cleaing to most cloceiv equate supplv rind demmd. All orders 
indicating a u,ill!ngness to buy at that price or higher. or to sell at that pnce or lower, are 
executed. T h e  London gold market operates as a twlce daily call market. The second 
distinction is herueen aucn'on markets and dealer markers. In an auction maker! investors' 
o rde r  are " e x p o s e d "  to the ma-ket! m d  trades occur directly between investors at an agreed 
price. I n  a dealer make:. competing dealers or market m&ers post bid and offer prices that 
investors can trade a t .  r?c:ion markets x e  termed orderdri'ven? and d d e r  markets u e  guote- 
dn'ven . 
3.3. Automat ion Functions in Financial Markets 
Automation servec a number of functions In finafcial markets, yet most markets are 
incompletely automated. a d  most retain some m z r ~ c d  functions. Listed below a-e the market 
functions that can be auromaied. 
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r Infonr,auon systems play an order co1lecr;'on role In +be processing of tndmg instmctions 
in ~nvestors' arid traders' offices. Once order IS entered Into an eiectron~c system, 
order d e & l  such as size, l imt  pnce. md time are accessible for an ~nvestor's control 
and measurement purposes, and for trmsmitung to a chosen market sysrem. 
e Systems for oMer muring dlrect oraer entered by a m e e r  io the ~ppropnate  market. 
The DOT system (Designated Order Turr,around) was introduced In 1976 for order 
rouung on the NYSE. Tne system eLab;es NYSE member f ~ n n s  to electronically route 
market orders and Iimit orders from their offices anywhere to the specialist post on the 
market fioor. bjpasslng the floor broiier's boorh. In 1992. 78 percent of NYSE order 
arnved via DOT. The remainder a n \ e  \/ia the phone to floor traoers' booths. 
r Price deremination is often suppond  o y  systems that aggregate tiie orders submined 
to a marker. The Anzona Stock Exchxge  (AZX) is a screen-baed market for trading 
stocks afrer the ciose of the New York Stoc'K Exchange floor. The system uses a single 
price call aucuon mechanism to find a pnce at which the auanup  to buy equals the 
quantlty to sell. 
@ Onler execufion systems electronicdiliy match buy and sell orders ~n a mzrket, and order 
confinnation systems route electron~c ~venf~caiions of a trade to the pmcipants  involved. 
Reuters' Dealing 2000 system ejectronjcdly matches buy and sell orders in the foreign 
exchange maker .  Details of execurea trades are then trmsmitted back to the trade 
participants for confirmation. No more than several seconds elapse between order entrl, 
to final trade confirmation. 
@ Systems are used for trade reponing md surveiZIance purposes. In the case of a fraud 
or market mznipulation investigat~or,. x, audit trail of trades can s p e d  investigztions 
The NYSE's S t ~ k l V a t c h  unit, for exmple ,  uses computers to monltor trading activities 
and to warn of unusual activity. which will be investigated by the staff. 
8 Svstems disseminae market in f o n n m o n  more broadly. The Consolidated T;iyp S:,c??n: 
(CTS) u a s  introduced in 1976. m d  imposed unified trade reporting nl!:~, and facilitated 
ticker publ ica~on of last sale informauon occumng in any of ~ ; ; n t  U.S. stock markets. 
Previously only NYSE and Amencm Stock Exchange ( i r ' r ;~X)  trades were reported on 
the ticker. The CTS informs a fa braider audience dr all trading activity on the NYSE, 
AMEX, the five regional stock exchmges, a p i t h e  OTC market. 
Information tech! ,j has many benefits in financial markets. First, visibility is 
increased, enabling investors to monitor the rr'arket, and to time the execution of their trading 
strategies. Systems provide the ability to hmdle increased volumes of business, and contribute 
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vduable economies of scale. Tn automated rnzkets, grGter trading voiumes lead to fractiond 
increases in overall costs, and a lowering in per trmsaction costs. lnregrafion and intemationzl 
linkzges czn be achieved with systems that share informztion between markets and enabie 
pwdciprints to p ~ s s  their positions from one rnaket to another. A number of markets including 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange m a  the Singzipre Internationd hlonetzy Exchange (STMEX) 
have autorriatd faciiities for "mutud offset". With mutual offser. zi position in one maker CZI 
be used to offset the margin required ir: ao ther  market. For insmce: a 15 contract ion: 
position zicquired in Chicago in T-bond futures, which is offset by a short position of !C i  
contmctc of the =me instrument in Singapore, requires mxgin to be put up for just the ner 
position of 5 contracts. Settlement efficiency is enhanced with systems. The number of 
questioned trades (QTs): don't knows (DKsj. and fails drops when trzding is automated and 
trade d e ~ i l s  are czptured electronicdly, reducing costly exception processing. 
3.4. Constituents in Screen-based Markets 
Screen-bzsed securities markets serve many stakeholders ~ncluding Investors, securit~es 
firms, and listed companies, as well as the securities exchange or vendor providing the systerri 
The orga+r,iiz;lons that play ope~ationd or informational roles In a screen-bzsed markets x c  
depicted beiou. 
canfimdnon5 
Figure 3: Iniormzuon Flows in  Automated Finzncid Mvke t s  
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T o  succeed. m automaied, screen-based zarket requlres coope~ation between a number of 
orgmlEbons,  the setting of technlcd str;ndads, and integrztlon of multiple information svstemc. 
A S  rr,ake:s have globallzed and d ~ a u n  more dispersed p z i c i p a t s .  achieving cooperat~on h z  
become more challenging. 
4. Screen-based Global Financial Markets: Tbe Foreign Exchange Market 
Today's most active m a  most zutornated globd mxi:er is in foreign currencies. Ejli~ons 
of U.Z. do l ias  are exchzii2e-d daily for Japanese ]'en (3,. British pound steriing (f,. 
Deutschmarks (DM), Swiss F m c r .  Canadian Dollus. French F ~ X I C S ,  and other cunencles. A 
dollar-!en exchmge rate of 110.75 r n m s  that $1 buys i 16.75 Len. or that Y 1  1s berth 0.857C. 
.45 active as it is. the foreign exchmge market hzs oniy a 20 year  histon. To  s ~ b i i l z e  
the ~ o r l d  economy after World War 11. leaders of major cabons met in 1946 in Bretron Woods. 
Yew Hampshire and agreed to a system of a fixed excl-.age rates centered on the dol!ar with 
a gold standard that pegged the dollar at $35 an ounce. The agreement collapsed In August 1971 
under the weight of a U.S. bdimce of payments defic~t. mind a weakening of the dol lx.  wnicn 
made conver~bil i ty  into gold at S35 an ounce untenable. Fore~gn exchange rates were diowea 
to float. and daily fluctuat~ons were the norm by 1973. 
Exchange rates between two currencies are a functlon of a number of factors including 
the reiative interest rates in the t ~ o  c untries, inflation, a d  the flow of payments between the 
two countries. Holding all other factors constant: 
(1) falling interest rates in one country will cause its currency to decline in value 
( 2 )  2 nation with a growlng bdmce of payments defic~t with mother country cx, expect its 
currency's value to decline relative to the other natlon's currency 
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( 3 )  lncrezsing infztlon in one country lower the vdue  of its currency 
l+olumes. In 1992. daily turnover in the iniern2ilond foreign exchange (FX) market was 
estlmzted at close to 51 uill~on The three m2jor finw~cid centers are credited with the 
folloulng daily FX volume:. 
/ (S billionj - March 1986 I 1 April 1992 1 
London 590 $1 8'7 $303 
New Yori. S.5 8 5129 $192 
T o h ~ o  $48 
TOTAL $190 2431 $623 
Table i :  Daiiv Foreign Exchmee Trddlns Volumes 
Source: E a k  of Engiuld ,  Qlianedy Bdietin, November 149: 
Significant FX t-adlng also occurs in Singapore (four~h with $80 bill~on traded dailv in 
1992). Zurich, Toronto, and Hong Kong. 
FX Trading Technolog?. The FX market is dom~r,ated by the world's largest banks. most of 
wnom trade currencies 24 hours a day from technologlcdiy sophisticated deallng rooms in the 
major financial centers. There is no market fioor for institutional spot market trading of 
currencies. 
The FX trader's desk contains an abundmce of information systems m d  data feeds, 
which together hsve an mnual cost of $30,000 to $50.000. There are four p r i m q  components 
of the trader's desktop technology. 
( I )  The desk will typlcdiy house a high dens* relephone system with speed-dialing access 
to twenty or more outgoing phone lines, display keys for counterparties. m a  buttons for 
muting the phone md settlng up multiparty conversations. 
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(2) Real-timr market dafa 1s provided by screzns displaying m a r ~ e t  information provided by 
third-party vendors such as Reuters and Teiemie. 
(3) Computer-based analytics xre often  use^ io chaii prices. and and! ze reiztlonships among 
finmcial ~nsuuments and economic a a 2  Anal)tics software I S  elther purchased as a 
package from a \endor, or is developed ~n-hovse. 
(4) Both traders wili enter the order Into their flrm's record keeping or on-line rmnsacfions 
processing systems, md  later the doi la  a - ~ d  ?en funds will be e i~ t ronlca l iv  mnsfened 
from one account to mother via m e i e ~ u o n ~ c  funds transfer system such as FedWire if 
the tmders are U.S.-based, or decide ro c l a r  the trade in the U.S.  
The 1973 ~ntroduct~on of the Reuters 3lonltor, \f\ih~ch displays competing bank dealers' 
foreign exchange quoies, spurred the developnent of the forelgn exchange market. The widely 
scattered mxket  that u a s  emerglng after the Eretton U d s  b r d d o w n  needed some way of 
posting pnces. Emi;s m d  other firms fed in the~r  pnces to Reuters' central sysrem, and the 
subscribers received consolidated muket ~niorrnatlon, and news supplled by Reuters 
correspondents around the globe. Fore~gn exchaige tzdes have tmdiliorizlly been effected over 
the phone. For Instmce, a bank represenilnf a mult~nalional customer tnat requires yen to pay 
a Japanese suppller wlll phone a deder that is olspiaying an attractlke ofienng quote for yen. 
In a short conversation, the bank's trader wili r e k d  hlm or herself, confirm the quote for the 
Intended trade, agree to the quanllty and pnce. The d d e r  w ~ l l  read b a c ~  aemls  of the trade 
such as "I sell \ou 50,000,000 yen at 116.750@ for $428.265.52." 
About 177.000 Reuiers terminals were ]nstdled around the globe In 1990. up from just 
55,000 in 1985. FZch ierininal has access to 73,000 pages of cont~nuously updated financial 
news and market prices. In 1981, Reuters ~ntroduced Dealing, a conversational electronic 
dealing system thar enables subscribers to negotiate and execute FX trades over their terminals. 
For the first terminal at a site, Monitor costs $1.800 a month and Dealing is $5.400. There 
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were about 16.000 Dealing terminals In ~ 5 e  in 1992. It is estimated that half of world's s p i  
FX tndes  n z r e  executed electronically over the Dealing trading system.' 
G6F3nC- 7.50 7 . 6 2  R E E U ! 2 : 5 2  GEFST-  -155 -152 
GBFDRC- 6 . 7 5  6 . 9 1  FFEJ 13:iT G b V r C -  -?57 -252 ' 
-- 
Figure 4: Reuters Te rmi rd  with Composite Display o: 
E n ~ i s h  Money Rates. a Pnce C:lzti. Fore:gn Exchange Rstes, &rid N e w s  
Transactions Cost illustration 
Q: How much would be paid in round-trlp tr tnsactions cos t s  for converttng $100,000 1 
into Deutschmarks,  and back to dollsrs the ~ n d ~ c a t e d  spot  market p r ~ c e s ;  I i 
I 
A: Fieadma from the  top line of t h e  middle screen,  a customer c s n  sell dollars a t  t h e  bid 
quote and receive 1.5385 DM for each  dollar sold. The customer can  buy dollars with 
Deutsch Marks from a dealer w h o  ~vill pay 1.5395 DM for each  dollar purchased.  1 
Euy @ 7.5385: 753,850.00DM Sell @ 17/7.53951= $06496: $99,935.04 1 
Jransacfions Ispreadl costs = $700,000 - $99,935.04 = $64.96 I I 
i 
By rnahng markets more transparent m d  accessible, one effect of screen tradins is to 
narrow bid-ask s p r a d s ,  and reduce transactions costs. In  the example above, the spread iz  
Gmdy,  T. "h4onopoly Mayhem". The Banker, February 1993, pp. 56-59. 
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(1.5395 - ! .5385)/ 1.5390 = 0.065 5 .  which is rimow arid refiexti~ e of the FX market's slze md 
, e f f i c ~ e n c ~  . 
X s m ~ i e n t .  The foreign exchage  ir,zrket has become a successful screen-based market for z 
number of rasons .  FX 1s a 24-hour mixket with p x ~ ~ c ~ p a t s  dispersed around Ine slobe. 
Comng rnro existence in 1971, i t  lzckcd a floor mvket trzcitior.. a d  the technolosy at the ume 
was sufficjent to deter attempts to deveIop a floor market i n  currencies. Finally, the FX n u k e ;  
1s an ifiter-~nstitut~onal, w h o l e ~ e  muket that is only loosei) regulaied by supranauond organ1- 
zt ionz such as the Bank for In te r r ia t~o~d Settlements (BIS). The pwticipants are sophisucztei 
f inmcid institutions, requiring iittle of the supervision xid protection necessary in other mxke:. 
w ~ t h  g ra i e r  numbers of individud in.ies[ois. Hence. the mwket operares without the extenslire 
cooApe:atjve mmgernents that would be required in other markets. 
i 
-. ,4n International Survey 
Financial markets around the globe have introduced technology to enhance the visibility 
of trading: and extend their reach to global participants. Improved information and maker 
access has fostered the growth In cross-border trading volumss. The activities of non-domestlc 
investors grew dramaticdilly in the 1980s. Between 1980 m d  1990, U.S. investors' trading 
zctiviw ~ricreased five-fold in o y e x a s  equities, and twenty-fold In overseas bonds. Foreign 
investors traded fifteen times more U.S. equities in 1990 compaed to 1980, and thirty t~mes  
more U .S.  bonds. Inierna~ional Securities Tra~saci ions Volumes In 2iilionz 
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In z d d ~ t ~ o n  to f a c i l i ~ u n g  the growth in cross-border t r~ding .  m a y  markets have been pressured 
to automate in response to competiwe thrats  from other financial centers. Iniema~onal 
mkestors zre mobiie, a d  ui!l withdraw from makers with rigid and o p q u e  m d ~ n g  
rntxhmlsms. For instmce. the 1986 deregu1a;ion md  openrng up of the London Stock Exchange 
attracted trading in many continentd securities lo London. m d  forced other European exchanges 
to increase the visibility of their narkets, and to enhmce the~r  tradlng systems. 
5.1. Europe 
The six largest Europea  stock markets traded z t o ~ 4  of about $6 bill~on daily In 199i 
T h ~ s  1s compaable to the voiume of $0.2 biliion on the NYSE in 1991 
A v f r z ~ e  Daily Tredinc Vorume imiiiions) 
F:gu:e 6 :  Tnaing Volumes in hlzjor European Stock Markets 
Source: F~nmc~z i  Tlmes (U.K.) 
Unjted Kingdom. The U.K. stock market is the largest in Europe, and its trading volume in 
international (non-U.K.) equities is the Iagest in the world. London is also the largest currency 
dealing center in the world with 5303 billion in dziiy turnover according the Bmk of England. 
London's current status 2s a leading international money center reflects a reversal from a 
watening position between 1950 and 1979. Up to October 1979, government exchange controls 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93- 12 
IT in lnternatjond Financid Markets Page 22 
restricted the conversion of pounds to other currencies md  prevented most British investment 
outside of the U.K.  At the ume. the London Siock Exchange was ciosed to non-U.K members. 
and imposed high. fixed commissions. Trcdiilg In ni2jor British compmles was flowlng into 
Kew York. where they t-ded as Amencan Dc,c~lc?ciroq Receipts (ADRs). Subsquent financial 
deregulauon in Bn tan  growing trrde uld flr,mc:d fiows within the European Communltv 
have revitahzed Lonaon's siatus as a finmcid nub 
U.K. DornWjc Equities. On October 28. !5'86. the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was 
deregulated m d  resmctilred by the Big Bong reiorns [CLEMgO]. Eig Bans was h e  result of 
a 1983 settlement reached with the British Go-vcrnment's Of5ce of F a r  Trade to end a lawsuir 
over restrictive practices and anti-competit~ve mies by ihe Exchage.  The Big Bmg changes 
abolished a fixed commission rate scheduie. a d  permitted firms to operzte in dual capacir)) as 
a broker-agent and  2s market makers ~raaing for their own account with customers. A 30 
percent limit on outside ownership of member ilrmc uas  removed. and Exchange membership 
was opened up to overseas firms. Findl?., SEAQ. a screen-besed market mechanism, was 
introduced to support the new Exchange operztlons. In the figure? four of the seventeen market 
makers are bidding f 13.03 to buy ICI shares. and four other market makers are offering £13.08 
to sell. The bid-ask spread of 5 pence, or 0.4% is considered tight, m a  indicative of a liquid 
and competitive market. 
Day's cur.uiacn: 
:v;nbl shut uc!umc (0x3) 
i 
i I \ stla/Fi-sE loo Cuo;Es 45547 j 1 :  1 
' Kt / IcI 3 0 ~ 1 3 0 5  ,FTC.OUI clcsmg ~ . a l  C I ~ ' s /  1 
VOL 880 LT 1303 5 5 2 3 1 4 1153, T n c  oi 
T 1300-010 5 x 5  
5ZKE 1303-CKF 5 i x K  
Chhr4% 1300-010 S C x X  
FLMC 1302-OE 5 D x X  
GSCO 1299-CKF 25x-5  
EOAE 1300-0i0 50x-X 
KCLE 1301-WE 55% 
.ixn: MERL 1302-01: n C  
MCSH 1300-006 ,-' 
rnadc: marc" 
M C S  
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Figure 7: Sample SEAQ Sc;esn Eispiay for Imperial Chemicals Industries 
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The London Stock Exchange operaies as a competing dealer market. In each stock there 
are a number of dealers. or market mzkers, that provide bid quotes (the pnce at which thev wiL 
buy shzres from customers), and ask quotes (the price at which they will sell shares to 
customers). Tne SEAQ system has one "page" for each issue that displays all market m&erc 
registered In thai security with their bid and ask quotes. There 1s zlso an indication of the 
number of shares the market maker is willing to commit to at those pnces. For Instance, 50x50 
means 50,000 shares bid and 50,000 h a e s  offered, md  1L m a s  100,000 shares. E\ 
negotiating over the phone. a trader can usually buy and sell In lager  quantities than those 
shown, and muket  makers will often a g r e  ro trade at prices dlfierent than those on the screen. 
SEAQ was modeled on the NASDAQ ' (~a t iona l  Acsoc:ailon of Securities Dezierz 
Automated Quotations) market in the U.S.. ivhich was introduced In the U.S. in 1971 as 2 
screen display of trading prices for OTC stocks. Prior to NASDAQ, OTC prices were conveyed 
via "pink sheets" that were distributed daily. The pink sheets listed dealers and their indicative 
quotes. NASDAQ m d  SEAQ enable dezlers to be geographically dispersed. Several SEAQ 
market makers are in fact located in Edinburgh, Scotland, 2nd several SEAQ-International 
market makers operate out of dealing rooms in Paris and Frankfun. SEAQ information is 
dis-played on computer screens, and investors, or brokers acting on behalf of investors, contact 
and make irades with dealers over the teiephone. The inside quotes displayed on the SEAQ 
screen - also cAled the touch - represent the best bid and offer available in London, and are 
prominently displayed, double sized, in a yeliow strip at the top of the SEAQ screen for each 
stock. The Intent when SEAQ was implemented was for the yellow stnp to give a rapid md  
accurate indication of the price at which the next trade in any shxe  could be expected to occur. 
Once a trade is executed the details of price and number of shrires are transmitted to the 
Exchange. which then publishes the stock's cumulative trading volume m d  the prices of the most 
recent trm.szctlons on the screen above the vellow strip. 
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London: Overseas E q u i t i e .  In 1985, the London Stock Exchange introduced SE.4Q 
Inremaliofid. a screen-based d d e r  market for the shzres of fore~gi: companies. The Exckange 
succeeded In  establishing acwe  ~nremationd market for trzdlng of non-U.K. securit~es zwa) 
from their home exchanges. Trading volume on SEAQ 1niematior.d y e w  from nothlng In 19% 
to S4OO rn~l i~on a day in 1985. md In 1,092 averaged f 1 .?O bliiio~i a cay. up from f 1.12 billion 
in  !S?9i. For comparison. in 1992. London mding in C I.;. and I5sh equities wzs f 1-71 billior, 
London is the most globd stock exchage toda), 1:sung about 760 non-U.K. sioci.~. 
c o r n p a d  with 121 foreign stocks t z d d  on the NYSE.' I ~ n d o n  atuacts more than two-third 
of dl equiiies trading that occurs outside of the stock's county of ongin. according to the Emk 
of Engimd. There were 49 firms operating as market makers on SEAQ-International in J m u q  
199s. 
Although daily trad~ng volume of domestic stocks in Yew York md Tokyo is far grater 
thm in London, trading volume of overseas securities on the New York Stock Exchmge 
averaged just 6441 million (f250 million) a day in 1991. md on the Toicyo Stock Exchange, 11 
bras lust $75 million per day in 199i. 
"Dimler 's Arrival M a r h  New Spirit at U.S. SexuSt~es Agency", Financial Times, 1 
April i993, p. 17. 
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D o m e s t ~ c  Average dally 
Llstmgs tradmp volume in 
1991 domestic shares 
1991 (5  rmllion) 
Table 2: Extent of Cross-Border 'Trzdlng In Major Stock Markets 
Sod i ce  Lorcoc Stock Exchange. Ficmc:d T ines  (7J.K.) 
Son-Domest~c Average dail) As a perceiitape 
L:stmg: tradmg volume m of total olarket 
1991 non-domestic shares tradmg +oiume 
1991 ( 5  mll lon)  
Fans 
Tne success of SEAQ-I has come mostly at the expense of less liquid and more costly 
- 
Lcnaon 2,245 2,318 772 1,992 46.2 R 
Yen k'orh 1,67E 6,278 441 6.6 % 
bourses in Continental Europe. SEAQ-1 turnover In some s h v e s  is often far greater than in the 
449 468 
s i ~ k ' s  home market. Table 5 indicates the volume of SEAQ-I trading in London relative to 
236 1 E 3.7 '5 
totals on the home markets. 
- 
Home country 1 SEAQ-I Trading Volume: Dall? .4s a percentage of  the home 
of stock 1 Average In 1991 (mll ions market's trading volume 
Netherlands 1 $165 6 50.3% 1 / Sweden I S100 .C~  4 5 . 0 5  1 ) France 1 5244.8 2 6 . 7 5  1 
Germany 5500.0 12.2% / 
Table 3: SEAQ-Inremabond Trading Volume in Continental Europem Stocks 
Source: Loodon Stock Exchange, F!n;acid Tlnies (U.K.) 
The Paris, Amsterdam, Stockholm, and F r a k i u f i  inukets have responded in m effort 
to regain volume in t h e ~ r  domestic shares. Market zuthorities in those countries have 
modernized their markets and enacted reforms aimed at lowering costs and repatriating trading 
voiume. For example, In the fourth q u m e r  of 199 1 ,  trading volume in the 18 l a d i n g  Swedish 
stmjis was 8.4 percent higher in London than in Stockholm. A two percent rurnover tax 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-93- 12 
TP in Internatiocal FFinzncjd Mxkets Page 26 
introduced in 1984 on securities transactions iri S ~ e d e n  was repealed in December 1991, and 
some volume has rerurned to Stockholm. I n  199:. boiumes in both mxkets were up, but the 
Stockholm exchange had 12 percent more turnoLer t h a  London in those 18 stocks. 
London: F u t u r e  and Options. The Lontion lnternatiorial Flnmciril Futures Exchange 
CIFFE) opened in September 1982. 3n No\erriker 1989, LIFFE introduced IPS Automated Pit 
Trading (ilPT) system. which simulates open ouicry trading on a screen for LIFFE members. 
APT operates from the ciose of the floor rr,;;_.ke? ai 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.. and averaged 5,000 
contracts a day in 1992. or about 4 percent of the LIFFE total. 
Germany. The 19E9 fd1 of the Berlin JTd1 2r?d the reunification of the country have had a 
massive impact on the economy. The country is unaeterred in its plans to establish "Finanzplatz 
Deutschland". m ~nternz~~onal  financial center in  Gerrr.any. Reforms kzbe been ~mplemented. 
and new tradmg technology has been developed to improbe the international competitiveness of 
the German markets. Screen-bzsed tradlng has been introduced. In Januarv 1991, a transaction 
tax of 0.10% to 0.25 %o of the value of a traiisactlon was repealed. Agreement was reached in 
October 1992 to launch a centralized German stock exchange, the Deursche Borse, to consolidate 
trading now spread across Frankfurt and seven regional markets. Trading 1s planned for the 30- 
50 most frequently traded equities and bond  i n  a fully-electronic screen dealing system. 
The technolog~caj showpiece of the German financial nma-ke?s 1s the Deutsche 
Terminborse OTB). Inaugurated in Januzy 1990. the DTB cost $85 milllon to develop. It 1s 
a fully computerized exchange for futures md options contracts. In November 1990, the DTE 
launched its Bund (Germm Government Bond) futures contract to compete with the active, floor- 
based LIFFE Buna market that opened in 1988. In spite of technological advantages - e.g., 
2 second execubon turn-around vs. 10 or more reconds on LIFFE - the DTB had just 30% of 
Bund futures tradlng volume in early 1993. with the rest remaining on LIFFE. Another 
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electron~c xarket,  IBIS Unterbank Infornauon System) was 1n;roduced In December 1989 for 
screen-baed tndlng of German equities. IBIS cost DM16 million ($10 million), and extended 
the three hours of operations of the Frmkfun floor market. IBIS was later acquired by the 
Fraakfurt S i ~ k  Exchange. In September 1991. IBIS accounted for 12 percent of the Frankfurt's 
uzdlng volume In the 30 blue-chip stocks In the D.4X index. Overall, traa~ng volume on IBIS 
averaged + - lust 300.000 shares daily in 1991. or jess than 10% of London's SEAQ-I volume ~n 
German stocks. 
France. The French financial markets unclerwent a "petit bmg" senes of reforms in the late 
1980s. Comm~sslons were unfixed, a d  rn 1988. bmks were dlowed to purch~se  stockbrokers. 
The P m s  Bou~se  ~ntroduced the CAC sysiem (Cozition Ass~st& en Contlnu) for electronic 
trading in July 1989. CAC is based on the CATS system, which w ~ s  developed in Toronto to 
provide order-dnven trading based on a continuous open order book In 1990, Relit a, 
advanced. 5105 million settlement system u a s  ~mplemented. Relit "dematerialized" settlemen:, 
moving dil ounershlp records to elecironrc form. and prompting the destruct~on of 40 tons of 
French shxe  cenlficates. A turnover +a of 0.15 % to 0.30% of the value of any uansaction is 
expected to be abolished. IBM is among the most active stocks on the automated foreign sectlon 
of the Pans Bourse, and averaged 3.5Fi (50.5) million a day In tyaaing value In 1991, compared 
to about S200 m~lllon In daily trading on the KYSE. 
Switzerland. SOFFEX (Swiss Opuons z ~ d  F~nancial Futures Exchange). an electronic trading 
and cl-ng system for derivative instruments, opened in May 1988. Recognizing the success 
of SOFFEX and the likely demise of thelr fioor markets, an the Easel. Geneva, and Zurich 
exchanges formed the Association Tripartite Bourses. which is develop~ng a screen-market b z e d  
on Sun Microsystems sP.acstations. 
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Canada. Toronto is Canada's pnnclpal financial center. The ?oronto Stock Exchange GSE) 
kandles 75 percent of the total \.due of t q d ~ n g  on Canada's fhe exchanges. The TSE t a d &  
1 17 m~lllon shares a day (CS 1.2 bllilon) on average In 1992. up 25.5 per cent from 199 1 .  The 
second and third Ixgest mzkets x e  In Montieal and Vancouve: in 1977, the TSE ~ntroduced 
the Computer Assisted Trzdlng System (CATS).' At the tirrie, the market floor v .2~  fully 
occupied, and CATS provided a m a s  of expanding capacit\ at low cost. The original plan ~ z s  
to offer screen-based trading in less sctlke S ~ O C ~ S .  'In 1990. 840 of the 1.650 l~sted s c u n u e s  
and 22 percent of the TSE's t r a ~ ~ n g  volume were on CATS. Facing the renewd of the l a s e  
on the floor market in Februarv 1992, 80 percent of the 72 TSE member firms voted 10 close 
the trading floor in late 1993, savlng CS30 million a y e a .  
Unjted States. The U.S. financial n-makets are among the iage5t a d  most advanced in the 
world. The two largest qui t les  rnzrkets in the world are the RYSE and NASDAQ. The U.S. 
T r e s u q  bond market is the lapest securities market in the world. 
U.S. Equities. The Secur?t!es Exchange Act of 1934 crrared a regulatory structure fo: 
the U.S. securities industry to g u z d  zgGnst fraud and the excesses that were exposed in the 
October 1929 crash. The S ~ u r ? i i e s  Exchange Comrni:slon (SEC) was estiiblished to oLersee 
mzrkets and securities firms. Oniy minor revisions &ere nzde  to the industry's reguiatorj 
structure until 1975. The Sexurit~es Act Amendments of 1975 o\~erhauled the 1914 Act. and 
provided a Congressional mandate for the SEC to develop a 'Marional Marker Sysrem" (&%IS) 
for transacting and trade settlement. After some initial d~sapreements, NMS was interpreted zs 
a c d l  for upgrading systems m a  establishing linkages, but not a call for a fully computerized 
v e r s i o n s  of CATS u e  now in use in stock markets In Tokyo, Paris, Brusselc. ~ r l 6  
hladrid. 
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securiues market. I t  has, houever. led to the introducr~on of many  important market informauon 
systems. 
e The National S ~ u r i i i e s  C i m n g  Corp. (NSCC) bas  crated in 1976 from the merger of 
the cleainghousec of the NYSE, the AMEX. .md the NASD. The NSCC lnst~tuted 
computerized book e n t i  r z s f e r  of securities ounershlp. and electronic pavmenrs. 
e The Intermarket Tzding System (ITS) implemented in 1978 to link the five regional 
exchanges and the OTC muket.  Orders can be routed between markets. off-exchange 
upsmrs dealers, md  maes can be executed over ITS. 
Stock exchanges In the U S. are competing to atirzct order flow from each other. Several 
regional exchanges offer zurometed execution systems for cmali orders that guarantee the best 
ITS pnce with faster executzon ume than on the NYSE fioo;. SelectNer allows NASDAQ 
members to send buy and sell order to other members' rerminds, and has begun to offer trading 
In NYSE-iisted stocks. In pnLaie, bilateral "conversailonc", orders can be accepted In pm or 
ful l .  and on-screen pnce quantity negotiations can occur between traders. 
U.S. Futures and Options. The Chicago Eoad  of Trade and the Chrcago Mercantile 
Exchange are the two lxgest denx~ztlves exchanges in the ~ o r l d .  The CBOT and  tne CME 
uaded an average of 600.030 md 525,000 conrr2c:s d a i y  In 1992. Rapid growth In overseas 
d e n ~ a u v e s  exchange is dlminishlng the dominance of the Chicago markets. Comblned CBOT- 
CME volumes accounted for zbout 43 percent of the ~ o r l d ' s  exchanse-traded denvatlves volume 
In 1992. which is down iron; 55 percent in 1990. 
The Chicago excnmges are using IT to man tan  therr internauonal posihon. Globex was 
iniuated by Reuters and the CME with tremendous ian?xe in September 1987. The CBOT 
eventually abandoned ~ t s  competing Aurora project. and jolned Globex as a sponsor. Globex 
uas  developed at a cost of S 80 nilllon, and opened i n  June 1992. It is not a 24-hour mzrket, 
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md oniy operates after the 2:30 P.M. close of the Ch~cago floor markets. Trading hours are 
6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M., but plans exist to zdd 2 2:30 P.M. to 4:00 P.M. session. 
Figure 8: 
Globex Trading 
in March, 1993 Globex was handling 3.500 contrzcts a day via 300 linked termlnzls, up from 
1,800 contracts daily in the month after the iaunch. Hence, Globex accounts for just 0.3% of 
the volume of the two floor markets. 
U.S. Off-Exchange Markets. U.S.  exchages have long competed vigorously for 
trading volume. Most major stocks trade actively in  several markets. Make t  participants refer 
to the NYSE and the AMEX as theJirsr marker. The five regional exchmges (Boston, Philadei- 
phia, Cincinnati? Chicago? and San Francisco) xe considered the second marker. The third 
marker is rnaae up of c i d e r s  trading over the teiephone from offices using NASDAQ screen 
prices. Thefounh market is direct trading between institutional investors. Technology has led 
to a proliferation of third and fourth market :radir;g systems, which have proven to be attractive 
to investors and traders. Equities trading away from the NYSE in NYSE-listed stocks is 
increasing. In 1980, just 12 percent of reporied trading in NYSE-listed stocks occurred off the 
NYSE floor. In 1992% i t  was 18.2 percent. Reported trade volumes miss an estimated 10-20 
million shares a day that a e  traded in oversms stock markets, or on electronic crossing 
networks. The distribution of trading below is based on available data and estimates. 
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Eeaionals 
C r i r i i n g / f l h  M k t  
Figure 9: Market S h x e  of Trading Volume 
in NYSE-Listed Eiquities - Third Q u a e r  1991 
Bunon Matkiel's A Random U'alk Down Wall Sfreer (1973) popularized the notion tha: 
active stock pichng was unlikely to l a d  to investment performance that 1s consistently betier 
than the return on the broad market 2s mmsure by indexes. Detziled studles of the investment 
performance of fund managers made c l e a  that the majority were generally unable to achieve 
even the returns registered on the benchmzrk unmanaged indexes of the market. As a result, 
"passive management" m d  "indexation" hake become incrasingly popular. Such strateg~e: 
require holding the securities in an index. m d  trading baskets of the stocks In an index at as  lo^ 
a cost as possible. Today. estimates are that between 30 and 35 percent of ~nstitutional equitv 
holdings In the U.S. are passively managed Index matching funds. A September 1989 survey'' 
of 36 of the largest U.S. pension funds with assets totaling $259 bllilon found 34% of their 
domestic equities holdings were indexed, a 4 % incrase from 1986. Pzsslve fund managers have 
become imporant users of off-exchange tmding systems. 
l o  Commltree on Investment of Empiovee Benefits, "Survey of Pension Fund Investment 
Practicest*, Firancial Executives Institute. Momstown, NJ, 1990. 
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There a e  a number of types of third md fourth mxket i radlng systems that compete for 
order with the floor-based exchange:. 
(i9E5) - indicative quotes,  5- 
i iO slliicn shares  
Table 4: Off-Exchange Trading Alternatives in the U.S. 
Several lessons are emerging from the U.S. experience w~th  aggressive inter-r~arirket 
competlt~on for order flou. T;asactlons costs to investors have generally fallen, but the 
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multipliczGon of electronic market systems and vz ied  level of information disclosure in some 
mding mechanisms mean some investors find i t  difficult to assess the quality of the trade pnces. 
Liquidin1 and the accuracy price discovery is gratest when trading is centralized? and the growth 
m mding systems that "bypass" the central mvkeplzce may l a d  to costly dupiicatjon and 
inefficiencies. The NYSE vgues that off-exchange trcd~ng systems "free-ride" on the prices 
d~scovered in the fioor market. but contribute little io the costs of operating the exchange. Some 
observers fear "competitive fragmentation" md a tiered marketplace with securities trading in 
different pnces in diiferent places? leaving only the most sophisticated traders to h o w  where 
to obtzin the best price. Tlie SEC is currently reviewing these n v k e t  fragmenution issues. 
5.3. Asia 
The Arim financial industry is dominated by fapar,. Success of Japanese companies in 
international markets, md a high saving rate have led to vasi pool of investment capital. The 
Jzpanese financial narkets x e  the lugest in Asia, and nine of the world twentv lugest banks 
Pverace Daily Traaing Volur;;~ (rniilions) 
zre Japanese. 
/ 
F ~ p r e  I0 : Trading Voiumes In  Major Asian Stock M x k e E  
Source: F l n a c l a l  Times (U.K.) 
Not included in figure x e  the consolidated Australian Stock Exchanges, which had d a d y  trading 
volume of $187 million in 1991? or slightly greater activity than the Hong Kong rxarket 
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Japan. The Tokyo Srnck Exchange (TSE) has the worid's lagest q u i t ~ e s  market in 1988, but 
LI-I 1992 placed third behind the NYSE and NASDAQ. The TSE's average daily trading value 
was about $3.5 bill~on in 1992. After rising at q 20 percent annual rate between 1980 and 1990. 
prices in the Japanese stock narket entered a prcionged slump in January 1990. The market 
index has fallen by half, and trading volumes a e  60 percent below thelr peak ievel from 1988. 
The TSE's trdding mechanism is an agent! auction over-wn bv a "Sarron ". a special 
class of TSE member. that matches subm~tied orders. and smooths pnce suings by calling 
uaalng halts when i m b d a c e  of buy and seli orders exlsts. TSE stocks have "pnce collars" 
that specify the maxIn-iurn d l o ~ a b l e  pr;ce mokemerit ~n a day. When these 11miis aie reached 
trading stops m a  c m  contlnue only at pnces uitii~n the limits. In contrast. KYSE specialists 
are expected to facilibte a continuous, " far  and orderly" market by trading as a principal for 
their own account. The TSE introduced the Cornpuier Assisted Order Routing and Execution 
Svstem (CORES) in 1982. CORES is modeled on Toronto's CATS. Floor trading has remained 
for the 150 most active Issues. and CORES ~ccounied for 44 percent of the TSE's volume in 
1989. T r a d ~ n ~ ;  Fioor (19 3 7 5 ~ 9  fi ; 
0 
A R C  l l . r n ,  k t 1  . T,.Cln. Po,, I T :  r r r  r E m *  
L. - .. .- 
L 
Trading Eours. 
9:GGa.m-ll:(iO; n. 
::OCip.m.- 3:OOp.r. 
~r :w n- tllxo A Lb. CCCES . ~ % r  
I .fit.. 0.n " 'X . .C  -, .Iciim-.l,. , 
Figure 11: Trading on the Toi.0 Stock Exchange - Fioor 
Trading Process and CO-FiES Screen Display 
Source: Tokyo Stock Exchmge 
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The CORES screen is broken into three sectlonc On the right hand slde is a display of pnces 
for a number of s tock  m d  the index. On the left hand side is defiled lnforrnation on a single 
stock. The top left section displays the name of the stock, its maximum aliowable trading range 
for the day, and n ~ x k e t  orders and market-on-close orders. The iower left sectlon is limit order 
 boo^, which In thls czse dlsplays a bid of Y1.840 for 9,200 shares and m offer pnce of 'Xl.SSO 
for 36.000 shues  with another 20,600 shares available at 'X1.860 
Dragon  Countries.  S~ngapore, Honp Kocg. T a ~ a .  and Seoul (Korea) are the financial 
capitals of the four Dragon countries. These counnies experienced rzpia economic growth md  
deveiopment In the 1980s. While the finmcid mrrivkets in these countries are not l u g e  by Nev, 
York-tondon-Toi2o s m d u d s ,  they x e  srou lng rapidly. The use of ~ a d ~ n p  technology varies 
from market to market. In Taiwm.'s mxket. for instiace. share pnces are posted on a 
chalkboard. m d  traders use binoculus to monitor changes. 
China .  The financial markets in China have tremendous potentid> but also carry enormous 
risks. China's finmcial industry is developing rapidlyt but with littie leadership or regulation. 
In 1992, fifty cornpmies were listed on the Shmghai and Shenzen exchmges - up from 15 in 
1991 - and daily trading volumes were S6S million in 1992 compared to $7 million daily in 
1991. The current speculative frenzy may hinder capital formation in the long term unless 
government repulztions are introduced. .As commercial m e  property laws are written. 
accounting s m d x d s  are established, a d  technoiogy improves, the Chinese markets will grow 
and attract greater global interest. 
6 .  international M a r k e t  and Technolog? Issues 
ildvmces In data processing and communications technology. and the opening up of 
markets, have ~ncreased the flow of financial information around the world. This has attracted 
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investors into o v e r s a s  markets that previousiy lacked visibiiity. and restricted market entrv znd 
competit;ion. Developments in trading networks and international cross-listings of securities have 
heightened competition for mding voiumes, are forcing antiquated exchznges to respond. h4anv 
observers foresee a unified globd ficzncid muket  based on screen trading. Despite optimistic 
forecas~s  for integrated, 24-hour securities niarkets, this vision is mmy years off. A numbel 
of b&ers exist to the technoiogy that could support a? integrated global financial m a k e ; .  
These hurdles include inertia and the critical Kass required to establish liquidity in a new t-ading 
mechanism, vested interests, regulatory discord, and IT deveiopment costs in ul indus ty  
contending with declining margin.. 
Critical Mass. In markets, a "network exiem&iiiity" exists becacse iiquidity is a self-reinforcing 
chmcterisi lc of trading; the greater the level of trader pmicipation, the more liquid md 
atiractive the market. For  a new trading system to develop liquidi~y requires a criticd mass of 
adopters, whose participation is bzsed on the system's liquidity. This paradox is reflected by 
a p"rtner in a major Wall Street firm commenting on the 1991 introduction of NASDAQ Inter- 
national for trading U.S. stocks between 3:30 a.m. 9:00 a . z .  New York time: "People ~fiq 
nor w e  ir because ir's nor very acrive, but if ir becomes niore acrive, rhen rhey'll lcre ii. "'I 
Most evidence about intermarket comapetition indicates that order flow is retained by the market 
that a l r a d v  hzs the greatest liquidity m d  depth. The director of f i n m c i d  ma..rkets at a French 
bank pointed out "people don't cal-e what medium they trade through, as long as it has the 
b ~ s i n e s s . " ' ~  Experience has shown that when an off-hours xzrket  is introduced, its l iquidih 
is limited. and investors prefer to wait for the domestic m a k e r  to open. 
Kewman, A. and Torres, C .  "SEC Will Vote on Plan to Allow Early-Hours U.S. Stock Trading". 
W'aU Srreet Journal  Europe, 9 October 1091, p. 15. 
l i  "Frankfurt Fights to Regain Bunds", Financial Times, November 26, 1990, p. 2 i  
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Some observers belleve that "in the long run. automated trading systems offer a richer 
mixture of the market informauon a d  the anonymity n e c e c q  for trading than either the crowd 
o r  the telephone."" Although auiomsted markets are technically feasible, trzding systems do 
not c r a t e  markets; public buying m d  selllng. and in _come cases deders  or specidlsts. are 
requued to create liquidltv aid a viabie market. 
In rare ~nstances m a e r s  have aemonstrated a ability to move their act~vltles to zn alter- 
zative ma-ket when ~t appeared aa\m&geous.  The pr iman m d  secondary markets ior Euro- 
bonds quickly moved from Keu 'I'ork to London after 1963. unen  the Kennedy admin!stration 
~nipored the Interest h ~ u d i z t l o n  Tax (IET), lowenng 1ri~esiors' returns on such bonds by about 
one percent. London did not offer a dlfierent trading meckir,ism: the market remaned m oLer- 
the-counter market. Yet because trades are physically settled - certificates need to be delnered 
to a ~ i ~ n g h o u s e  o r  to the conuz-part) - the market den\  es operational benefits from a single 
locale. and the relocat~on of the Eurobond market representea a z c l t  collective decision to move 
trading to an alternative center. The IET was repealed in 1974, but the market has rema~ned 
In London. Trading volume in Eurobonds in 1992 u z s  about S10 billion a dav. up from $6 
bllllon In 1990. l4 
In other cases, trading mechanisms that a p p a ~ e d  to offer technological a d \ a ~ t a g e s  were 
ignored by and renamed illiquid. h4any zrtenprs to create alternative r ~ a r k e t s  for 
securities have failed: the C~ncinnati Stock Exchange (1983). Ariel (1974) in the U.K. .  Eoss in 
Germmy (1989), and Iniex (1984). a Bermuda-based autornaied futures exchange. are  examples 
are examples of electronically-supported trading mech;~nisms that failed to attract l~quidity and 
never seriously challenged the d o m l n a c e  of established, floor-based markets. 
'"Complaints about Poor Liquidity", Financial Times, 21 December 1992, p. 19 
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Vested Inter-r. Computer-based market syciems enzble traders in diverse geographic 
lncations to intenct, discover prices, and execute trades Through a trading screen. Tne result 
is a new market smcture without the time me grog;-aphic constmints of participating in floor- 
bzsed stock exchanges. In many screen-based rmrkets, irivestors a e  capable of trading directly 
with each other, bypassing the traditionzl roie pisyed by dealer intermediailes. Since the 
existing, dominant structure for securities uzding in most countries lnvolves a profitabie 
intermediary roie similar to the NYSE si>ecialist, rsablished participants may resist chmge. 
Furthermore, firms that a e  earning inadequate returns on capital are not willing to cooperate 
m d  support trading technology project that could furiher reduce margins. 
New m a k e s  often operaie as open 1;rrii: orcer books, which &re \ . i~ible to market 
pmicipznts, who c m  enter l im~t  orders, or irzde ~mrn&;ately by match~ng an exlstlng order. 
I t  is often ugued that without the necessity of pzying the ~ntermedianec' ccsrs. ~nvestors will 
r a p  larger gains from trade znd higher market qualitv wlli result. However. thls neglects the 
potential vdue  of ~ntermediatlon. Market nake;s izith a continuous market presence. such as 
s p i a l i s t s  on the New York Stock Exchange. n a y  Improve the qual~ty of the market at a cost 
less than the vdue  of the servlce T\rVEBE91]. 1niermed:-aes stabilize pnces bv buvlng or selling 
2s principds when the net order flow is ~ m b d ~ i c e a ,  md  also contribute bv manmning a "fair 
and orderly" market. 
The Eurobond market has resisted ztternpts to introduce real-ume screen prices. A 
proposed system, Eurex, was rejected by the reli-regulatory body m d  trade ~ssociation for 
Eurobond dezders in 1983. Since then, several refined proposals have been spumed by dealers 
:n the market. The b a k s  that trade in the mvket feel their ability to trade profitably would be 
compromised by too much transparency. Vesrea interests strive to mainlun the current market 
mechanism, which is telephone search of dealers. who can quote comfomblv wide bid-ask 
spreads. 
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Discordant Regulations. To achieve an in~egraied global market requires unified regulatoq 
policies. In fact, regulations vary considerable from country to c o u n q ?  m d  are often self- 
serving responses ro national r ivalne~.  Despite the efforts of internationd coordination 
committees, a inconsistent pattern of reguiations exists. Mmy countries have established of 
m u m 1  recopnirion. or reciprociry agreemenrs, whereby one country's firms can sell financial 
products to another's domestic investors, and vice versa. Such bilateral access agreements are 
useful, but iliustrate the protective s t a c e  &?ten toward financial rriarkets in most countries. 
Until reguiaton' authorities begin to converge on a global s'mda-d? makers will rema.in multi- 
domestic rather ihm global. 
The ct,mges in global markets habe p r o ~ t e d  the reexam~nation of regulations to ensure 
the intemat~onal competitneness of a countn's or 2 reglon's financ~d sector. The U.S. financid 
markets u e  unoergoing thorough stu64 Recent studies of poilcy Issues include "Secunues 
Trading: SEC Act~on Needed to Address h'atlonal Market System Issues" by the Generd 
Accounlng Off~ce  (1??0), "Electron~c Bulls m d  E m s "  by the Office of Technoiogy Assessment 
(1990), m d  the Securit~es and Exchange Comm~ssion's Market 2000 study. due In early 1993. 
The tweive member nations of the European Community (EC) at? seelung to harmonize 
regulations and financial services access. The idea of a single market for securities trading has 
not taken hold because of contention about its market structure m d  re,oulation. A system to 
electronically link EC stock markets was approved in 1989. The svstem was termed PIPE for 
Price Information Project Europe, m a  a company named Euroquote was established to develop 
the network. The objective was to publish the prices of 200 or more securities on a new list of 
European blue-chip stocks. In 1991, the pro!ect slalled when EC exchanges admitted their 
conflicting objectives for PIPE, and declined to inject $15 million in capital into the project. 
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Cost and inexperience uith technolog,. Some obseners xFue  that markets x e  filghi) 
s o p h i s u ~ t e d  processors of infornabon m d  s~gnds .  Giken such compiexlty. it is not evident that 
screen-based trdding currently offers a more atmctive muket design than a market based or, 
face-to-fxe ~nteraction. Mark Hzrdlng. the h a d  finmc!r;l markets group at Clifford Chmce. 
a law finn. said "I do not think anyone hzs found a computerized qs tem.  which is user inendil 
or slmple enough to t&e the place of open outcry trading " Skeritics point out that a muiriier 
may appezr to be an easily-automated t-&saction process. but ~t 1s &so a complex p n w  
discoverv mechanism. . 
Furthermore, initiatives to develop more sophisti~ated n:zket systems a.re exper,s;-Le 
Globex cost $80 million. The Dm cost 585 million to ae.;elop The London Stock E x c h a g r  
abmdoned its TAURUS settlement system in March 1993, after spending £75 million and 
encouzgng the industry to i n c ~ r  costs of 5 2 . 5  million in debeloplng Interfaces and connection> 
to the planned systems. 
7.  Conclusions 
Information technology enhx~ces  a market's abtllty to perform valuable econom~c 
functions: providing liquidity m d  chxinelllng investment funds inio productive uses. Across the 
globe, t r a c i ~ g  processes are belnp restructured. and automatlon conilnues to lower the costs o i  
uansacung a d  monitoring financial markets. Technology. along with sweeping changes Ir, 
regulauons, and investor interest in cross-border diversificat~or,. x e  driving up internabofid 
trading volumes. Competing for t rd lng  volumes, network prov~ders such as Reuters, and the 
major ~n te rna~ona l  exchanges are Incraslng their use of informarlon technology. In a number 
of markets. screen-based trading has taken the place of physical marketplaces and trading floors 
Experience shows that informat~on technoiogy threatens some sources of profits in the secuntle: 
industry. but ~t also creates opportunlues and a m m s  of reacung to market challenges. 
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lnrernat~onal market inreFrauon I S  occurring. but in a t . z p h w d  way. Todav's "global 
firiacizl market" 1s actually multiple mding structure:. ma f ~ r m s  with a patchwork of local 
expenlse In many markets. Progress toward uniformity of re$ulauons and market pract~ces IS 
spottl. m d  the deslgn of m integrated global finmcld ma-ket remans cloudea wlth man\ 
technologlcd m d  regulatov Issues unsolved. Fragmentea ri~xkets that impose inefficiencies and 
require experuse in local pnctlces may be a consequence of iack of agreement on tne structure 
of m integrated financial market The consoiidated. ~ o r l d u i o e  xchange is illuson "The End 
of Gmgr;?phyn remains an elusive goal. 
The vading systems of the n w  future will likely be global routing systems that connect 
md  nantz in  consistent pnces zcross multiple markets internat~ondly. Regulators will contlnue 
to seek coordination among markets to reduce risks and ~nefficiency. Indexation and passlve 
Investing will grow. More rick management activities m d  aenvatlves trading are likely. All 
of these stratesies require extensive IT investments wid systems capabilities on the part of firms. 
and advmced market technologies to be provided by exchmges and trading network providers. 
Clezrly. responding effect~vely to the changes and pressures will be the hallmark of successful 
firms md  expanding market centers in the coming years 
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